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I. INTRODUCION
A tension runs through the Palestinian-Israeli efforts at accommodation, and its resolution may be key to the success of the endeavor. The
tension is between solutions that are based on the legitimate rights and
interests of the parties on the one hand, and solutions that are deemed
politically feasible on the other. Ideally, the two would coincide so that
* This article was the basis of a presentation delivered by Professor Quigley as part
of a discontinuous symposium entitled, The Legal Foundationsfor PeaceandProsperity
in the Middle East, sponsored by the CaseWestern ReserveJournalof InternationalLaw
and the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center. Professor Quigley delivered this
presentation at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law on March 25, 1999.
Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University.
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the parties could readily agree on terms that would be widely acknowledged as protecting the rights of all concerned.
The positions taken to date, however, particularly on the Israeli side,
deviate significantly from what is called for by relevant international
norms. As a result, the prospect looms of an agreement that will violate
rights on the Palestinian side. Such an agreement would likely be challenged by Palestinians adversely affected, a challenge that could be expressed in an individual manner as persons seek redress for themselves,
or collectively, in the form of concerted political action in opposition to
the agreement. If such challenges occur, the agreement will be in jeopardy, and violence is likely to result.
This Article explores the issues to be addressed in the final status
negotiations between the PLO and Israel. It examines the public position
taken by each party on these issues and the legal norms relevant to them.
It then examines the part played by the international community with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and in particular the international
community's attitude to the role of legal norms. Finally, the Article seeks
ways of implementing an approach that would maximize the conformity
of the solutions reached to applicable legal norms.

Il. THE PLACE OF LEGAL NORMS INTERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS
Negotiations about a settlement between two contending parties in a
territorial dispute are inevitably influenced by political factors. The relative bargaining strength of the two parties may be a significant determinant of the outcome, as the party in the stronger position seeks advantages even to the detriment of the legally protected interests of the party
in the weaker position.
The relevance of legal norms in such settlements is seen in the handling of the myriad problems that have arisen in eastern Europe following the break-up of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the treatment of
minority ethnic Russians in new states on Russia's periphery threatened
to lead to armed conflict. European institutions, and in particular the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), assumed a
prominent role on this issue, and its approach was heavily based on ensuring the protection of the legal rights of the affected populations. Finding an obligation on all states to grant citizenship rights to long-term inhabitants, regardless of their ethnicity, the OSCE pressured states like
Estonia and Latvia to conform to legal norms as the European institutions
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found those norms to be, and thus to admit as nationals groups of ethnic

Russians that those states would have preferred to exclude.'
It has long been recognized that in such situations individuals as
such and in their collectivity have legally protected interests that the parties must respect. Peace agreements routinely require states to respect the
rights of inhabitants whose ethnic affiliation put them on the side of the
erstwhile adversary. 2 If sovereignty in a territory changes, the new sovereign typically honors the rights of inhabitants, regardless of ethnic
affiliation. Examples among many are the agreements by which the
United States acquired Florida from Spain, and Alaska from Russia? In

each instance, the United States respected land titles granted by the
former sovereign, 4 as well as the right of all inhabitants to remain in the
territory.5
Extensive attention was given to the rights of inhabitants following

World War I, when the state boundaries of much of Europe were reconfigured at the Versailles conference, leaving many ethnic groups a minority in a state dominated by some other ethnic group. The League of Na-

tions developed an extensive system of protection, and treaties required
these states to respect the rights of minorities in such matters as the use
of their language, exercise of their religion, and access to public services

and public employment.6

1 See Recommendations by the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,
Mr. Max van der Stoel, Upon His Visits to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 14 HuM. RTs.
L.J. 216,220 (1993) (offering recommendations about treatment of minorities in Latvia).
2
See Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public InternationalLaw, 39
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 284, 291 (1963).
3 See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252 (the treaty
under which the United States acquired Florida from Spain); Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America to the United States of America, Mar.
30, 1867, U.S.-Russ., 15 Stat. 539 [hereinafter Treaty Concerning Cession of the Russian
Possessions].
4 See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, supra note 3, art. 8, ("all the grants of
land made before the 24th of January 1818, by his Catholic majesty, or by his lawful
authorities, in the said territories ceded by his majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, .... ", enforced in United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833)); Treaty Concerning Cession ofthe Russian Possessions, supra note 3, art. 2 (recognizing Russian land titles).
5 See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, supra note 3, art. 6 (requiring
the United States to extend citizenship to inhabitants of ceded territory); Treaty Concerning Cession of the Russian Possessions, supra note 3, art. 3 (giving citizenship rights to
Russian nationals resident in Alaska unless they moved back to Russia).
6 See Treaty of Peace with Germany (The Versailles Treaty), June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43 (stating that residents of the Saar basin were to retain certain rights); Treaty
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The danger of ignoring rights of individuals and peoples is apparent

if one recalls instances of failure to respect those rights. One leading example is the failure, after World War I, to create a Kurdish state in the

territory of the former Ottoman Empire. Despite tentative agreement to
create such a state,7 the boundaries finally agreed upon between Turkey
and the Allies split the Kurds' territory among other states.' Eight dec-

ades later, the Kurdish issue continues as a highly contentious matter on
the international agenda. Kurds find themselves in a position of inferiority in the states into which the Kurdish territory was divided, and sharp
hostility, often manifested in violence, continues.' In Turkey, even speak-

ing in favor of Kurd separatism is a criminal offense, and the government

regularly prosecutes persons who advocate Kurdish independence."0 A
number of convictions have been criticized by the European Commission

on Human Rights.
Such rights protection in peace agreements is viewed as critical to
the stability of the peace. The OSCE, as its title implies, takes on as its
primary task the maintenance of stability on the continent. Its work to
secure the protection of ethnic minorities in the territory of the former
Soviet Union was motivated primarily by security considerations. The

same was true for the indicated activity of the League of Nations after
World War I. It was feared that the newly configured borders of Europe
would crumble if disaffected ethnic minorities began to appeal to the

governments of states in which the particular minority was a majority.
Thus, protecting the rights of those minorities was critical to the peace.

Between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, Sept. 10, 1919, arts. 7, 9, 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 312 (ManleyO. Hudson ed., 1931); Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania, Dec. 9, 1919, 5 L.N.T.S. 335; see also Treaty Concerning the Protection of Minorities in Greece, Aug. 10, 1920, 28 L.N.T.S. 243 (recognizing the rights of all Greek citizens regardless of race or creed).
7 See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, Aug. 10, 1920, art. 64,
15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 193 (Supp. 1921) (never ratified).
8 See Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, art. 3, 28 L.N.T.S. 11, 17.
9 See Richard Falk, Problems and Prospectsfor the Kurdish Struggle for SelfDeterminationAfter the End of the Gulfand Cold Wars, 5 MICH. J. INT'LL. 591, 591-93
(1994).
10 See Press Releases Issued by the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights

(Strasbourg, March 1998) (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/engPRESSI
emarch98.html> (summarizing Commission decisions in Karatas v. Turkey, Arsland v.
Turkey, E.P. v. Turkey, Ceylan v. Turkey, Okcuoglu v. Turkey, Gerger v. Turkey, Erdogu and Ince v. Turkey, and Surek v. Turkey).
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International responsibility for rights protection in peace agreements
increased with the creation of the United Nations. Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council was given responsibility for dealing with threats
to the peace, and if a territorial settlement is one not likely to hold, international peace may be threatened." Another post-war development that
enhanced international responsibility was the adoption in 1949 of the
Geneva Civilians Convention, which incorporated the notion of the collective responsibility of states parties for the rights of persons in territories under belligerent occupation.' 2
The emergence of human rights law at that same period also
strengthened rights protection in such situations, because any state controlling territory must respect the rights of the inhabitants, even apart
from a stipulation in a treaty of accession. The three developments -creation of the United Nations, collective responsibility for belligerent
occupation, and the emergence of human rights law -- further internationalized such matters, requiring states to conform to generally recognized standards in their treatment of individuals and population groups in
territorial settlements.
mII. UNITED NATIONS AND THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS

International efforts at promoting an accommodation between the Israelis and the Palestinians have also been focused on the protection of
rights. In the 1980s, that effort centered on the possibility of an international conference to find a solution. The United Nations had long viewed
the rights of the Palestinians as being in jeopardy, particularly since the
1967 war, when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the
Jordan River, two sectors of historic Palestine that it had not occupied in
1948. As suggested by the United Nations General Assembly, an international conference would be convened with certain principles understood
in advance to protect the rights of the Palestinians. These rights would
include the right of return for displaced Palestinians, the right of selfdetermination of the Palestinian people and their right to establish a state,
an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including Jerusalem, and a rejection of the permissibility of Israeli settlements in the
Gaza Strip and West Bank. 3 The United Nations had previously deter-

art. 39.

"

See U.N.

12

See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

CHARTER,

War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Civilians Convention].
13 See G.A. Res. 38/58C, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 47, U.N. Doe
A138/47 (1983).
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mined Israel to be in violation of international law on these issues.14
Thus, protection of rights was built into the contemplated peace process.
That approach was abandoned, however, in 1991, when the United
States and the Soviet Union hosted a conference in Madrid to promote
instead a negotiation between the two parties alone, rather than an international conference, and with no explicit prior specification of the rights
to be protected. 5 Israel and the PLO were to negotiate a solution that,
presumably, would be recognized by the international community. 6 The
advantage of this approach was that the interested parties were those best
positioned to resolve the myriad issues involved. The disadvantage was
that this approach put the international community in the background and
thus reduced its ability to ensure that their agreement would remain
within the bounds of what is required by international norms. The Madrid
approach gave more play to the power relationship between the two parties and brought the risk that Israel, as the stronger of the two parties,
might force acceptance of its entire agenda.
What role remained for the international community in the Madrid
process was a matter of controversy. The United States has taken what
one might call an extreme bilateralist view of the process. Under this
view, the PLO and Israel were to be left alone to work out an agreement,
and the international community is not to interfere, even if one or another
of the parties takes action that might jeopardize the process.
One of the stipulations that the United States made as co-convener
of the Palestinian-Israeli talks was that the U.N. Security Council in particular should take a hands-off approach to the process. In a letter to the
Palestinian negotiating team early in the process, the U.S. Department of
State wrote:
With regard to the role of the United Nations, the U.N. Secretary General will send a representative to the conference as an observer. The cosponsors will keep the Secretary General apprised of the progress of the
negotiations. Agreements reached between the parties will be registered
with the U.N. Secretariat and reported to the Security Council, and the
parties will seek the Council's endorsement of such agreements. Since
it is in the interest of all parties for this process to succeed, while this

See S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2203d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc S/INF/36
(1980).
15 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Mideast Foes List Demands and Trade Angry ChargesAcross
14

Conference Table, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at Al.
16 See The Peace Conference, 6 PALESTINEY.B. INT'LL. 262-302 (1990-91) (providing documents related to the Madrid conference).
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process is actively ongoing, the United States will not support a competing or parallel process in the United Nations Security Council. 7
The United States, as will be indicated below, construed the last sentence broadly, to the point of opposing Security Council condemnation of
acts by Israel widely recognized as unlawful with respect to matters on
which the two parties must come to agreement. Although it engaged in
discussions with Israel to encourage it to avoid unlawful actions that
jeopardize the peace process, it eschewed formal United Nations action
aimed at that end.
Most other United Nations member states, to the contrary, have
taken a view of the post-Madrid process that is more multilateralist, and
thus more in keeping with the approach taken in the 1980s. They have
considered that the international community retains a responsibility, and
they have been willing to apply pressure against actions deemed injurious
to the process.
The difference in perspective first came to a head in 1995 over Israel's confiscation of land for new settlements for Israeli civilians in east
Jerusalem. Most U.N. member states considered Israel's actions so detrimental to an eventual Israeli-Palestinian accommodation as to require
U.N. pressure on Israel to reverse its course. The Palestinians anticipated
exercising sovereignty in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, but if Israel inserted more settlers, that prospect diminished. In the Security Council, a
draft resolution was proposed to condemn Israel's plan. Fourteen of the
Council's fifteen members voted in favor of the resolution, but it was not
adopted as result of a veto cast by the United States. 8
Council members other than the United States viewed stopping Israel's plan as critical to preserving the legal position of the two parties,
thus ensuring that an eventual accommodation would accord with generally recognized standards - here the right of self-determination and the
prohibition against inserting settlers into occupied territory. During debate on the draft resolution, the delegate of the United Kingdom expressed concern about the impact of Israel's action, saying that Israel
should "refrain from taking actions which seek to change the status quo

17 U.S. Letter of Assurances to the Palestinians, Oct. 18, 1991, in 6 PALESTINE Y.B.
INT'LL. 281, 281-82 (1990-91).
18 See U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3538th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV13538 (1995); see

also Barbara Crossette, U.S. Vetoes a Condemnation in U.N. of IsraeliLand Seizure,
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1995, at AI0.
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on this most sensitive of all issues before the conclusion of the finalstatus negotiations." 9
In early 1997, the same issue came to the fore again, when Israel announced plans to build 6500 units of housing for Jews in the Jebel Abu
Ghneim section of east Jerusalem, which Israel planned to name Har
HomaY The evident aim was to complete a line of settlements between
east Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, thus giving Israel greater
control over Jerusalem, which it hoped would emerge from a PalestinianIsraeli agreement under its exclusive sovereignty." In the U.N. Security
Council, a European-sponsored resolution was tabled to condemn Israel's
plan as illegal, and a "major obstacle to peace." Again, fourteen Council
members voted in favor, but again the United States vetoed.' The United
States viewed both the draft resolutions as an interference with the Palestinian-Israeli bilateral process, whereas the other Council members
viewed Israel's actions as constituting such an interference.
United Nations activity did not end with the two vetoes, however.
Member states were sufficiently concerned about Israel's actions to take
the matter to the General Assembly, where no state has veto power. The
draft resolution over Jebel Abu Ghneim/Har Homa that the United States
vetoed in the Security Council was proposed in the General Assembly as
a draft resolution, and the Assembly adopted it. This resolution characterized the planned settlement construction as illegal under the law of
belligerent occupation and "[c]all[ed] upon the Israeli authorities to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which

,9 U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3538th mtg., supra note 18, at 7 (comments by Sir David
Hannay, U.K.); see also id. at 3-5, 8 (comments of Mr. Lavrov, Russian Federation; Mr.
Wisnumurti, Indonesia; Mr. Fulci, Italy; and Mr. Mdrimde, France, all asserting that the
1995 land seizures were intended to preempt the Palestinian claim of sovereignty in east
Jerusalem).
2 See Serge Schmemann, Jewish Housingfor EastJerusalem Approved, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1997, at Al.

21 See Netanyahu Insists Har Homa Goes On, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 11,

1997, available in 1997 WL 13452534 (stating that the Palestinians and the United
States are of the view that the aim of the Har Homa settlement is to give control as a
precursor to keeping the area in final status negotiations).
2

See Paul Lewis, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Criticism of Israel's ConstructionPlan, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 8, 1997, at A3; U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3747th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3747 (1997).

1999] LAW IN A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI ACCOMMODATION

359

alter the facts on the ground, preempting the final status negotiations, and
having negative implications for the Middle East Peace Process. ' '"
Despite the General Assembly call, Israel shortly began construction
of the planned Har Homa settlement, an action that prompted renewed
activity in the Security Council. A draft resolution was proposed there
asking that Israel "immediately cease construction of the Jebel Abu
Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as all other Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories." Thirteen Council members
voted in favor of the draft resolution, but the United States again vetoed.24 Consistent with its prior position, the United States considered the
draft resolution an inappropriate interference in the bilateral process. The
U.S. delegate, explaining the veto, said that the United Nations was not
the "proper forum" for discussion, but rather that "the parties themselves
are those that should deal with these very, very important issues."'
In the wake of this U.S. veto in the Security Council, the General
Assembly invoked its "Uniting for Peace" procedure to convene a special
session to address the issue. This procedure, devised by the General Assembly during the Korean war, calls for a General Assembly recommendation to deal with a threat to the peace when the Security Council has
been prevented from acting because of a veto of a permanent member.2
By a new resolution, the Assembly reiterated its criticism of Israel's construction of Har Homa and took the additional step of asking states to
refrain from giving aid to Israel that might be used for that constructionY
This latter call was obviously aimed at the United States, the only state
that gives aid to Israel, implying that this aid was facilitating Israel's acts
that jeopardized the peace process.

2
G.A. Res. 51/223, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 93rd mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/223 (1997); see also Paul Lewis, Israel'sPlanforJerusalemis Condemned by
Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at A12.
24 See U.N. Press Release SC/6345, Security Council Again Fails to Adopt Resolu-

tion on Israeli Settlement, Mar. 21, 1997 (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http://www.un.org>
(document search); Paul Lewis, U.S. Again Vetoes a Move by U.N. Condemning Israel,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1997, at A4 (describing Costa Rica's abstention); U.N. SCOR, 52d
Sess., 3756th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3756 (1997).
2

Rene Slama, Washington to Veto Resolution Again on Settlement, AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE, Mar. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
2
See G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950).
27 See G.A. Res. ES-10/2, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emerg. Spec. Sess., 3d plen. mtg. at 1-3,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/ES-10/2 (1997); see also Israel Warned to Halt New Housing for
Jews, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 1997, at A4.
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When by mid-1997 no action had been taken by Israel to stop construction of the Har Homa settlement, the General Assembly re-opened
its special session and by resolution condemned Israel for ignoring its
prior resolutions, and called on states signatory to the Geneva Civilians
Convention to hold a conference on enforcement of the Convention in the
occupied territories. The Geneva Civilians Convention is the principal
treaty on belligerent occupation, and it calls for collective enforcement
action.' The resolution also called on Israel to provide information on
goods produced in its settlements, and called on states to discourage activities, even by private parties, that directly contribute to Israel's settlement construction in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem.'
Later in 1997, the General Assembly again took up the matter of assembling the parties to the Geneva Civilians Convention, this time calling on Switzerland, as the depository state for that Convention, to hold a
meeting of experts from the states party to the Convention to prepare for
a meeting of the high contracting parties that presumably would pressure
Israel to stop construction of housing for more settlers. The Assembly set
a target date of February 28, 1998 for the meeting of experts to be held.,
As of March 1998, the meeting had not been called by Switzerland, so
the General Assembly adopted a follow-up resolution reiterating its call
for a meeting of experts, and extended the target date to April 30, 1998.31
All these General Assembly resolutions were adopted by overwhelming majorities, with only the United States, Israel, and a handful of
other states voting in the negative or abstaining. The United States consistently viewed these resolutions as interfering with the bilateral process. The large majority that voted for these resolutions considered, to the
contrary, that Israel's actions interfered with the bilateral process, and
that these actions needed to be reversed if that process were to have any
chance of success. The majority took the view that such actions, precisely because they were unlawful, would lead the eventual accommodation in a negative direction. The majority placed greater emphasis than
did the United States on an accommodation in which legal rights would
be respected.
2

See Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.

29 See G.A. Res. ES-10/3, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emerg. Spec. Sess., 5th plen. mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/3 (1997); see also Farhan Haq, U.N.-Middle East Assembly
Rebukes Israeli Settlers, Inter Press Serv., July 15, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 7076470.
30 See G.A. Res. ES-10/4, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emerg. Spec. Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 3,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/ES-10/4 (1997) (adopted 139 to 3, with 13 abstentions, negative votes
being those of Israel, Micronesia, and the United States).
31 See G.A. Res. ES-10/5, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emerg. Spec. Sess., 9th plen. mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/ES-10/5 (1998).
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Reacting to the General Assembly's request, Switzerland invited Israel and the PLO to attend a meeting in Geneva in June 1998, with the
objective of convening experts from all states party to the Geneva Civilians Convention in the autumn of 1998. Israel and the PLO participated
in the June meeting, and the International Committee of the Red Cross,
also invited by Switzerland, participated as an observer.'
This Swiss approach differed from what the General Assembly had
requested in that Switzerland was preparing not a meeting of the high
contracting parties, but rather a meeting of experts to be designated by
the high contracting parties. A meeting of experts would not be in a position to take action that might induce Israel to comply with the Geneva
Civilians Convention. Further, the preparatory meeting called by Switzerland was not of experts of all the high contracting parties, but only of
Israel, the PLO, and itself, with the International Committee of the Red
Cross observing.
In a related 1998 action that reflected a similar difference in perspective between the United States and other U.N. member states, the
General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to upgrade the PLO's observer
status at the United Nations in a way that moved it closer to being considered a state.33 In the 1970s, the General Assembly had declared that
the Palestinian people were entitled to self-determination' and on that
basis, granted the PLO the status of an observer at the United Nations.'
The 1998 resolution allowed the PLO to act more like a state at the
United Nations, although it still left it without the right to vote.
The United States, as one of only four states to vote in the negative
on this resolution,36 argued that the resolution would "undermine our ef-

3
See generally, e.g., Jay Bushinsky, Israelis,PalestiniansBack HumanitarianLaw
Talks, JERUSALEM POST, June 12, 1998, at 2 (noting that the meeting resulted in frank
and constructive talks). In 1999, the General Assembly requested that the Convention's
Parties, rather than Switzerland, convene a meeting of the Parties, and set a date of July
15, 1999 for such meeting. See G.A. Res. ES-10/6, U.N. GAOR, Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RE 5/ES-10/6 (1999).
33 See Participationof Palestinein the Work of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 52/250,
U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 89th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/521250 (1998).
34 See G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
3 See G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
36 See Barbara Crossette, Palestinians' U.N. Role Widened; A U.S. 'No' Vote is
Overwhelmed, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1998, at A8 (indicating that the four states voting in
the negative were the United States, Israel, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia).
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forts to get the peace process back on track."' The majority, to judge
from the text of the resolution, viewed the recognition of the PLO's
status as being helpful to the process. The resolution recited ways in
which the PLO was carrying out governance in the Gaza Strip and West
Bank and thus was exercising functions normally associated with state
sovereignty.
IV. DIFFERENCES IN THE APPROACH TO ISSUES

The tension between a strongly law-based approach and one in
which legal standards would play a minor role is apparent with respect to
the major outstanding issues between the two parties. The parties' initial
agreement, their 1993 Declaration of Principles, contemplates a phased
transfer of authority from Israel to the PLO over a five-year period, leading to negotiations on a "final status" between the parties.' The Declaration of Principles specified the major issues in dispute that would require
resolution in the "final status" negotiations which were to be completed
by the end of the interim period. 39
The outstanding issues specified in the Declaration are those that
have long separated the two parties and have kept them from reaching
agreement. They are: 1) the drawing of a border between the territories to
be held by each party; 2) the fate of settlements Israel has built in the
Palestinian territory it occupies; 3) the status of Palestinians displaced in
the hostilities of 1948 and 1967; and 4) an appropriate regime of control
for the city of Jerusalem.
This framing of the issues was advantageous to Israel in that it excluded any mention of Israel's status as a state and thus implied recognition by the PLO that Israel's status as a state was not being challenged by
the PLO - contrary to the position it took on that issue in earlier years.
Concurrent with the signing of the 1993 Declaration, the PLO sent a
separate communication to Israel recognizing it as a state.4
The four issues specified in the 1993 Declaration are issues that remain after the dispensing of that basic issue. They are all highly contentious, involving matters that are quite basic in the world view of each of
the parties. Resolution of these issues is not expected to come readily. On
37

Id.

38 See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, art. 5, 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1528 (1993).
39 See id. art. 5 (agreement between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization to
negotiate on "permanent status" issues).
40 See Letter from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, PLO, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister
of Israel (Sept. 9, 1993) (reprintedin 7 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 230 (1992-94)).
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each of the four issues, the two parties espouse widely differing positions. Each issue is impacted by international legal norms, and each has
been the subject of consideration by the United Nations, which has devoted considerable attention to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.
When one examines the position of the two parties on each of the
four issues, one finds a difference with respect to the conformity of the
positions to the applicable international legal standards. Both parties in
their analysis of these issues devote attention to the applicable legal standards. Both claim that their positions conform to those standards.
The conformity or non-conformity of the parties' positions to legal
standards is highly relevant to the viability of those positions. As suggested above, if positions that find their way into a territorial agreement
conform to legal standards, the chances that the agreement will hold in
the long term are considerably higher. Each of the four outstanding issues will next be analyzed from this perspective. The position of each
party will be examined for its conformity to legal standards. The four
issues are: borders, settlements, displaced persons, and Jerusalem.
A. Borders
One key issue, perhaps the most important, to be resolved between
the two parties is that of a future border. During the period leading up to
negotiations, the PLO has been anxious to have Israel withdraw from as
much territory as possible, whereas Israel has been anxious to remain in
control of substantial sectors. The 1993 bilateral Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO requires Israel to engage in a phased
withdrawal that would have it out of the territories by the time final
status talks begin.
The 1993 Declaration of Principles calls for negotiations to be based
on a resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 1967, Resolution
242. Adopted in the wake of the June 1967 war, Resolution 242 referred
to the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory [i.e., the Gaza Strip
and West Bank] by war."'4 ' The resolution called for the "withdrawal
of
4
Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."
Israel insists on maintaining control of substantial sectors of the
Gaza Strip, and particularly the West Bank, for the indefinite future. A
document circulated at a 1997 meeting of Israel's cabinet suggested an
41 See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, supra

note 38, art. 5, at 1529 (agreement between Israel and P.L.O to negotiate on "permanent
status" issues).
4 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22JREV.2
(1967).
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intent to claim land sectors in the Jerusalem area, and in the Jordan River
valley.43 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a 1998 interview, indicated the degree to which he hopes to remain in control of the Gaza Strip
and West Bank when he said, regarding his aims in the negotiations, that
Israel should control all international passage points, and that he opposed
the formation of a Palestinian entity that could be called a state.'
These expressions of intent notwithstanding, by signing the 1993
Declaration of Principles with its reference to Resolution 242, Israel
agreed to negotiate on the basis of an understanding that it must withdraw. The Declaration of Principles is an internationally binding instrument. Although Israel disputes this point, the Declaration of Principles is
an instrument whose content is of the character customarily found in interntational treaties, and the PLO had the legal capacity to enter such an
agreement."
The PLO, along with most U.N. member states, construes the withdrawal obligation in Resolution 242 as requiring Israel to withdraw from
all, or substantially all, of the territory of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
Israel, to the contrary, views it as calling on Israel to withdraw from an
unspecified portion of the territory of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, a
portion that might be rather small.46 The dispute centers on the fact that,
in the English language version of Resolution 242, the definite article
was, during the drafting process, deleted as a modifier of the "territories"
from which Israel was being asked to withdraw. Israel views this deletion
as indicating that it was not expected to withdraw from all the territories.
The PLO view is that Resolution 242 calls on Israel to withdraw
from substantially the entire territory of the Gaza Strip and West Bank,
leaving to the parties the possibility of negotiating border adjustments of
a minor character.4 7 The PLO's view is the more widely held view of the
meaning of Resolution 242 and more consistent with its text and history.
The preamble language referring to the inadmissibility of the acquisition
See PalestiniansBlast Report that Israel Wants Most of West Bank, DEUTSCHE
May 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA File.
44 See Herb Keinon & Saul Singer, We Are Not "Freiers,'"JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 29,
1998, at 13, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
43

PRESSE-AGENTUR,

45 See generally John Quigley, The Israel-PLOInterim Agreements: Are They Treaties?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 717 (1997) (noting that Israel disputes the binding character of the Declaration).
46 See Letter of Assurances, Oct. 18, 1991, in 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 286, 288
(1990-91) (noting the difference of interpretation of Resolution 242).
47 See MUSA MAZZAWI, PALESTINE AND THE LAW: GUIDELINES FOR THE RESOLUTION

200-24 (1997) (offering a detailed analysis of Resolution
242 as calling for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories).
OFTHE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
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of territory by military means strongly implies an obligation to withdraw
from such territory. The text in the French version preserves the definite
article, and so that text suggests that Israel must withdraw from "the territory" of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
Statements by delegates at the time of passage suggest that some
were reluctant to insist on Israel's withdrawal precisely to the territory it
occupied prior to the 1967 war, because the territory it occupied up until
that date was territory it held under armistice agreements signed in 1949
with neighboring states, agreements that were not viewed as establishing
borders. Thus, there was reluctance to require Israel to withdraw to lines
that might, by virtue of such a call for withdrawal, be viewed as bearing
a legitimacy that they did not in fact enjoy.'
The withdrawal language of Resolution 242 is not, in any event,
consistent with a partial Israeli withdrawal that would leave it in control
of substantial sectors of the Gaza Strip or West Bank. Resolution 242
must be construed consistently with applicable international legal norms,
and these are quite clear on the matter of territory occupied during hostilities. Such territory does not fall under the sovereignty of the occupant,
and possession by virtue of occupation gives it no basis for a claim to
sovereignty. Belligerent occupation yields only a right of temporary possession, not title to territory. The sovereign right of the legitimate sovereign remains intact, even though it is not able to exercise control.' Thus,
even apart from what Resolution 242 may mean, Israel is under an obligation to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
B. Settlements
The issue of borders is closely connected to that of the civilian settlements that have been established by Israel in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank. Israel appears inclined to continue, after a peace agreement,
to control territory on which it has located settlements. According to positions taken by the Netanyahu government, Israel anticipates that its settlements will remain under an accommodation with the PLO, and that
Israel will continue to control the territory of the settlements. In a 1998
interview, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, responding to a question
about his position on retention of the settlements, said, "our insistence

See id. at 211-12.
49 See generally GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 768 (1992); see also
MALcoLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 287 (3rd ed. 1991). Cf. Yehuda Z. Blum, The
Missing Reversioner:Reflections on the Status of Judeaand Samaria,3 ISRAEL L. REV.
279 (1968) (arguing that Israel's claim to the West Bank is strongest).
4s
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has been on keeping all the settlements."' Netanyahu indicated his aim
as well to keep the land around the settlements. 5'
The PLO entered into the 1993 Declaration of Principles even
though it knew that Israel would control the areas of its settlements
through the interim period. An approach had been attempted by the Palestinian negotiators in 1991-92 to get Israel to stop applying Israeli law
to the settlements and the settlers. It wanted Israel to agree to such a cessation before the two parties arrived at any agreement about an interim
period, and about a Palestinian self-governing authority.5 2 The PLO,
when it inserted itself into the negotiating process in 1993, did not insist
on such an immediate cessation of Israeli authority.
The question remains, nonetheless, whether the settlers will remain
or leave after a final PLO-Israel agreement. The PLO takes the view that
they have no right to remain, whereas Israel takes the view that they do.
The PLO view is more consistent with the applicable legal norm because
of the regime of belligerent occupation that applies to these territories.
International law typically protects the right of persons to remain in
their areas of habitation, even if sovereignty changes. 3 However, with a
belligerent occupation the situation differs. The end of a belligerent occupation is not a change in sovereignty, because the onset of a belligerent
occupation does not bring about a change in sovereignty. A belligerent
occupant acquires no sovereign rights, and, indeed, Israel has not claimed
sovereignty on the basis of its occupation of the Gaza Strip and West
Bank.
The law of belligerent occupation is found in customary international law, and in the 1907 Hague Regulations,54 and the 1949 Geneva
Civilians Convention.55 The Hague Regulations are widely viewed as
having entered the corpus of customary law.' The law of belligerent occupation requires an occupying power to preserve the existing order as
50

Keinon & Singer, supra note 44, at 13.

5' See id.
52

RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE PALES-

269-71 (1997).
See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-Seventh
Session, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex, at 271-75, U.N. Doc. A/50/10
(1995) (stating that every person has a right to nationality).
54 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
Annex, art. 43, 1 Bevans 631, 651 (1907) [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
55 See Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 12, at 287.
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56 See ESTHER
1982, 43 (1985).
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much as is possible, in the expectation that it will ultimately withdraw. It
must preserve the "civil life" of the territory. 7
Under the law of belligerent occupation, the establishment of civilian settlements is unlawful. Article 49 of the Geneva Civilians Convention states, "The Occupying Power shall not... transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies." ' The Hague Regulations do not address the transfer of civilians, but prohibit use of land in
occupied territory for settlement construction. The Hague Regulations
require the occupying power to administer public lands to benefit the local population,59 and instruct it not to confiscate private property.6 Thus,
under the Hague Regulations, use of either public or private land for
settlement construction is forbidden.
Israel's settlements have been condemned by other states and by
United Nations bodies as being in violation of Article 49 of the Geneva
Civilians Convention. The General Assembly, in one of many resolutions
on the matter, "strongly condemn[ed] . . . [the] [e]stablishment of new

Israeli settlements and expansion of the existing settlements on private
and public Arab lands, and transfer of an alien population thereto." 6 ' The
Security Council resolved that "Israel's policy and practices of settling
parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories [the territories occupied in 1967] constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War [Geneva Civilians Convention] and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle
East."6
If, contrary to the law of belligerent occupation, an occupant settles
its nationals, those persons gain no right of residency. For example, after
World War II, Italians who had settled during the war in territory occupied by Italy gained no right of nationality in the states whose territory
Italy occupied. These states agreed to extend their nationality to Italians

See Hague Regulations, supra note 54, art. 43 (note use of the term vie publique in
the official French text of the regulations).
57

58 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 12, art. 49.
59 See Hague Regulations, supra note
54, art. 55.
60 See id. art. 46.
61 G.A. Res. 37/88C, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 93, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1982-83).
62 S.C. Res. 465, supra note 14, at 5.
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who settled prior to the war, but not to those who settled during the occupation.63
Israel followed the accepted practice in its only previous withdrawal
by agreement from territory it had occupied. In 1979, Israel agreed to
withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, territory of Egypt that it had occupied during the 1967 war. As part of that withdrawal, Israel agreed to
evacuate Israelis who had settled during the time of its occupation.' Israel complied with this obligation and evacuated these settlers.6
The legally required outcome regarding the settlers is that they have
no residency rights that must be respected by the sovereign of the territory. Their presence was, ab initio, a violation of the rights of the sovereign, and Israel was under a continuing obligation to ensure their departure.
Those Palestinians who own land that was confiscated for the construction of settlements are particularly in jeopardy if a solution is
achieved along Israel's preferred path. This would include both those
Palestinians who held undisputed title, and the many others whose land
was deemed by Israel to be public land, but which under the Jordanian
law in effect in 1967 was land privately owned.6 If a PLO-Israeli agreement were to allow Israel to retain the settlements, the question would
arise regarding the rights of these landowners. If they were left uncompensated, their rights would be violated. Even if they were, under the
agreement, to be compensated, the question would arise as to whether
they could, in effect, be forced to sell. Property owners whose property
rights are left unsatisfied by a PLO-Israel agreement would have legitimate claims that they might pursue.
C. DisplacedPersons
While the issue of Israeli settlers is likely to prove problematic, so
too is the issue of Palestinians who were displaced at the time Israel was
See Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 19, 61 Stat. 1245, 1379, 49
U.N.T.S. 3, 136 (setting as the cutoff date June 10, 1940, the date on which Italy declared war on France and Great Britain).
64 See Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt,
Mar. 26, 1979, Isr.-Egypt, Annex I, 1138 U.N.T.S. 59, 133 ("Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later than three years from
the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty").
65 See David K. Shipler, Israel Completes Pullout, Leaving Sinai to Egypt, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1982, at Al (reporting on Israel's pullout of troops and settlements from
Sinai).
66 See RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 28 (1988).
63
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established in 1948. Here again the law-based outcome is that being advocated by the PLO Persons displaced in connection with a military conflict are entitled to return to their places of origin, and this is so regardless of the reason for their departure. The only exception to a right of return is that in which a person voluntarily takes on a new citizenship in a
manner that indicates a renunciation of residency rights in the former
locale. The right of return is not defeated by a change in sovereignty in
the territory from which a person was displaced.'
This norm requiring a state to repatriate the displaced is followed in
international practice. In dealing with military conflict situations, the
United Nations Security Council requires states to repatriate the displaced. In the conflict of the early 1990s in Bosnia, the Security Council
resolved that "all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to
their former homes."' Regarding Serbs displaced from their home areas
in Croatia, the Council demanded that Croatia
[I]in conformity with internationally recognized standards... respect
fully the rights of the local Serb population including their rights to remain, leave or return in safety... [and] create conditions conducive to
the return of those persons who have left their homes.'
The United Nations has long taken the view that Israel is required to
repatriate Palestinians displaced in 1948. In its first comprehensive resolution on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict after Israel established itself as a
state, the General Assembly said that
[T]he refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable
date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those
choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by
the Governments or authorities responsible.'
Israel rejected any obligation to repatriate, disputing the existence of
a norm of international law that would require it to do so. However, such
an obligation is firmly embedded in international law. An obligation to
repatriate the displaced first appeared in the law as a corollary to the
6
See generally John Quigley, Mass Displacement and the Individual Right of Return, 68 BRrrISHY. B. INT'LL. 65, 88-111 (1997).

s S. C. Res. 779, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3118th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/779
(1992).
69 S.C. Res. 1009, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3563d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1009
(1995).
70 G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 24, U.N. Do. A/810 (1948).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

370

[Vol. 31:351

right of states to expel those who do not hold its nationality. Since states
are not obliged to let aliens remain permanently in their territory, the
state of origin is required to take them back. The obligation to admit
one's nationals is said to be "an inherent duty of States resulting from the
conception of nationality.'
The obligation to repatriate falls as well on a state, like Israel, that
newly establishes itself in the territory from which persons were displaced. The state newly in sovereignty may not defeat the right of return
by refusing to deem a person its national.' Thus,
A state may not refuse to receive into its territory a person, upon his
expulsion by or exclusion from the territory of another state, if such
person is a national of the first state or if such person was formerly its
national and lost its nationality without having or acquiring the nationality of any other state.73
A Council of Europe treaty requires a state newly assuming sovereignty to refrain from making racial or ethnic distinctions according to
nationality, and to take account of the habitual residence and place of
birth of persons affected. 74 The provision mandating use of these factors
must be applied, according to an official commentary to the European
treaty, "in the light of the presumption under international law that the
population follows the change of sovereignty over the territory in matters
of nationality." 75 The International Law Commission takes the same position in a draft treaty on nationality rights in a change of sovereignty.76
Israel has, in declining to repatriate, argued that it lacks space to accommodate large numbers of Palestinians. That rationale is without a
legal foundation and as a factual matter is belied by Israel's continuing
willingness to accept substantial numbers of Jews. In the waning years of
the Soviet Union, Israel took in half a million new immigrants. Prime
71 PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51

(Hyperion Press 1979).
'p- See RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 87 (1972).
73 Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, Draft Conventions and
Comments on Nationality, Responsibility of States for Injuriesto Aliens, and Territorial
Waters, The Law of Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT'LL. 13, 16, art. 20 (Supp. 1929).
74

See European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, art. 18, Europ. T.S. No.

166.
7'

Id. at 47.

76

See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-Ninth

Session, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 10, arts. 4, 20, 22, 24, U.N. Doc. A/52/10
(1997).
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Minister Netanyahu, asked in 1998 whether "there can be another decade
in which a million Jews immigrate to Israel," answered in the affirmative.
Israel's position on repatriation is inconsistent with its international
obligation. The PLO's insistence on repatriation is consistent with Israel's international obligation. An Israel-PLO agreement based on nonrepatriation would leave a substantial segment of the Palestinian population without satisfaction of their legal rights.
D. Jerusalem
The final outstanding issue between Israel and the PLO is that of the
status of Jerusalem. Both Israel and the PLO take the position that they
are entitled to sovereignty in Jerusalem. Here again the PLO view is
more consistent with international norms. The Palestinian claim to sovereignty is based on centuries-long occupation of Palestine. Jerusalem is a
part of that territory.'
Israel's claim to sovereignty is stated in 1980 legislation that declares Jerusalem, including both its western and eastern sectors, to be
Israel's capital city.' This legislation was construed by an Israeli court to
be a claim of sovereignty over both sectors of Jerusalem?
While Israel makes a claim to sovereignty in Jerusalem, the basis for
that claim is not clear. Israel's principal claim to sovereignty over any
territory in historic Palestine lies in the U.N. General Assembly's 1947
recommendation that two states, one Jewish and one Arab, be established
there.8 When the Jewish Agency for Palestine declared the establishment

77 Keinon & Singer, supra note 44, at 13.
7 See generally HENRY CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGAL
ASPECTS OF TH ARAB-ISRAELI CoNF~cr 64-73 (1973) (discussing claims to Palestine in
general); U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex 3 at 13, U.N. Doc. A/43/827, S/20278 (1988)
(discussing Palestine's claim of displacement from its homeland).
7
See Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 L.S.I. 209 (1980) (declaring that
"Jerusalem, complete and united is the capital of Israel").

g See generally Asher Felix Landau, Court Upholds Israel's Rights on Temple
Mount, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 15, 1993, at 7 (summarizing the case of Temple Mount
Faithful Assoc. v. Attorney General, in which Justice Elon described the history of the
Temple Mount in order to establish its bond with the citizens of Israel).
81 See G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
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in 1948 of a state to be called Israel, it cited the 1947 General Assembly

resolution as its principal legal base.'
That resolution set boundaries for the two projected states but put
Jerusalem out of the territory of either, suggesting instead that Jerusalem
be an internationally administered enclave.83 As a result, the resolution
provides neither side with a basis for claiming Jerusalem. The international community, consistent with the position of the 1947 resolution, to
date considers the question of sovereignty in Jerusalem to be unresolved,
despite Israel's factual control of west Jerusalem since 1948, and of east
Jerusalem since 1967.
Regarding East Jerusalem, Israel faces an additional obstacle be-

cause it took east Jerusalem in hostilities. Under international law, territory taken in hostilities is not subject to appropriation by the occupant,
regardless of the circumstances under which it came into possession. The

United Nations has consistently taken the view that east Jerusalem is territory under Israel's belligerent occupation and hence is not under its
sovereignty. When Israel took steps to incorporate east Jerusalem into4
itself, the United Nations reacted by denouncing the action as unlawful.8

In the absence of any legal base put forward by Israel itself, various
scholars have argued, in support of Israel's claim to sovereignty in Jeru-

salem, that Palestine had no sovereign when Great Britain abandoned in
1948 its League of Nations role as mandatory power in Palestine. Ac-

cording to this argument, Palestine was open to occupation by whoever
might take it, and on this basis Israel has sovereignty over whatever territory it controls, including west Jerusalem from 1948, and east Jerusalem
from 1967."

82
See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948)
(mentioning an historic connection of the Jews to the territory of Palestine, but it is not
clear if this is the basis of a legal claim).
83 See G.A. Res. 181, supra note 81, at 146.

84 See S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1417th mtg. at 9,
U.N. Doc.
S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968) (condemning Israeli measures affecting Jerusalem as tantamount
to annexation, which the resolution found unlawful for a belligerent occupant as it found
Israel to be); S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2245th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/36 (1981); see also G. A. Res. 35/169(E), U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 95th plen. mtg.
at 28, U.N. Doc. AJ35/48 (1981) (condemning as unlawful an Israeli law on sovereignty
over Jerusalem).

85 See D.P.
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140 (1965); see also Stephen M.

Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest? 64 AM. J. INT'LL. 344, 346 (1970) (stating that
Israel was acting defensively in 1948 and 1967, thus giving it better title to seized lands

than was obtained by Jordan and Egypt);
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This theory enjoys little following, however, because under the
League of Nations arrangement, sovereignty lay in the community of
citizens of Palestine, not in Great Britain. A population under a League
mandate was deemed to be a subject of international law with a legal interest in the territory that was separate from that of the mandatory
power.' In Palestine under the mandate, the inhabitants carried a Palestinian citizenship. 7 When Britain withdrew, the community of citizens
was entitled to exercise sovereignty. The majority of that community of
citizens was represented by a political organization, the Arab Higher
Committee, that was recognized by the United Nations, and which asserted a right to establish a government for Palestine. Thus, Britain's departure left no void of sovereignty.
The international community has given little support to Israel's
claims over Jerusalem. Regarding the eastern sector, it has considered it
to be under belligerent occupation, and therefore not subject to appropriation by Israel.' Regarding the western sector, it has continued to
view the proposal for an internationalized status as viable, and nearly all
states that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel have declined to locate their embassies in Jerusalem.
V. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
The gulf between what is legally required and what is politically
feasible raises problems for both the negotiating parties and the international community. For the international community, the difficulties are
already apparent in the U.N.'s handling of the issue. As indicated, the
thrust of U.N. activity, the blocking efforts of the United States notwithstanding, has been to orient the process towards conformity with legal
demands. The U.S. policy, on the other hand, seems oriented towards
finding agreement between the two parties, with less insistence that the
agreement conform with legal demands. The United States, to be sure,
HOLY PLACEs 44-45 (Anglo-Israel Assoc. 1968); see also Blum, supra note 49, at 294
(concluding that Israel can show better title to those territories).
8
See James Brown Scott, The Two Institutes of InternationalLaw, 23 AM. J. INT'L
L. 87, 91 (1932) (quoting paragraph 6 of a 1931 resolution of the Institute of International Law).
87 See Convention Between the United States and Great Britain in Respect to Rights
in Palestine, Dec. 3, 1924, U.S.-U.K., art. 7, 44 Stat. 2184, 2186 (commonly referred to
as "Mandate for Palestine"); The Palestine Citizenship Order, 1925, S.R. & 0., No. 777,
at 474-75 (July 24, 1925); Norman Bentwich, Nationality in Mandated TerritoriesDetachedfroin Turkey, 7 BRIT. Y.B. INT'LL. 97, 102 (1926).
88 See S.C. Res. 478, supra note 84, at 14. See also G. A. Res. 35/169(E), supra note
84, at 28.
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acknowledges the desirability of a fair accommodation but is unwilling to
exert on Israel the kind of pressure that other states believe to be required. It continues to support Israel with substantial military and economic aid in the face of activities by Israel that the international community finds incompatible with reaching an accommodation with the Palestinians. It has declined, in particular, to comply with the General Assembly's call to stop financial aid that Israel can use to construct settlements
in east Jerusalem.
The consequences of an accommodation that does not conform to
legal requirements are hard to judge. As with anything in human affairs,
it is possible that such an accommodation might stick, despite the deep
resentment and unresolved grievances it would leave on the Palestinian
side. Such an outcome is, however, unlikely. Several million Palestinian
refugees live in poor conditions in neighboring Middle East states, whose
governments have no obligation to allow them to remain, or to grant
them the rights of citizens. Largely stateless, this population has been the
base in the past for the Palestinian military organizations that brought the
Palestinian claims onto the international community's agenda in the
1960s and 1970s.
The PLO's strategy of a provisional accommodation with Israel in
the hopes that Palestinian limited self-rule might develop into full-blown
statehood was met with skepticism by a variety of Palestinian political
groupings. 9 That skepticism grew with the accession to power in 1996 of
the Netanyahu government, which was openly critical of the prior Israeli
government as being too accommodating towards the Palestinians. Substantial segments of the Palestinian community are poised to take up political opposition if an accommodation is reached that does not accord
with legal requirements. An Israel-PLO accommodation on Israel's terms
might bring a challenge to the PLO by other political forces. The Islamic
group Hamas is today the best positioned for such a role.
On the Israeli side, to be sure, there are groups that would be disaffected if an accommodation were reached on terms that conform to legal
requirements. In particular, a segment of Israel's settlers in the Gaza
Strip and West Bank might stage a rear-guard campaign if required to
abandon their settlements or to submit to being under full Palestinian
sovereignty. When Israel dismantled settlements in the Sinai peninsula
under the Camp David agreement with Egypt, some settlers resisted, but
the matter was resolved through financial compensation paid by Israel to

89 See John West, PalestinianOppositionPressuresPLO on Peace, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, Apr. 25, 1994, available in NEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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the settlers.9° Some Gaza Strip or West Bank settlers might resist an order
from the Israeli government to vacate. However, many settlers appear
resigned to the need to vacate and are raising the issue of monetary compensation. 9
There is a key difference between the potential demands of disaffected Palestinians and disaffected Israelis, namely, that the demands of
the former would be consistent with legal requirements, whereas the demands of the latter would not. That difference would likely affect the
reaction of the international community.
VI. A RomE FOR THE UN TED NATIONS
The Palestinian-Israeli controversy is, for the United Nations, its
longest-running conflict. The conflict was on the world organization's
first agenda. The effort by the international community in creating the
United Nations to impose observance of human rights and selfdetermination of peoples as principles that must be observed has for the
entire lifetime of the organization stood in contradiction to the situation
of illegality represented by the subordination of the rights of the Palestinian population of what had been inter-war Palestine.
Now half a century later, Israel and the PLO are locked in dispute
over the Gaza Strip and West Bank, which constitute only about twenty
per cent of the territory of the former Palestine, and Israel is not disposed
to allow Palestinian sovereignty even in that small area. From the standpoint of seeking a law-based solution, one can with some justification
argue that the time for such passed long ago, and therefore that it is
pointless to use legal standards as a basis for an Israeli-Palestinian accommodation. No solution with a realistic chance of being implemented
can restore Palestine to the Palestinian people from whom it was
wrenched, in anything like its former form.
The fact that a true restoration of the status quo ante cannot be
achieved is not, however, a license for a continuing disregard of rights.
An accommodation can be reached in which Palestinians enjoy full sovereignty over the Gaza Strip and West Bank, in which Israeli settlements
can be dismantled, in which displaced Palestinians can be repatriated to
Israel, and in which an appropriate status for Jerusalem can be achieved.
9D See William Claiborne, Israel, Settlers Fail to Agree on Sinai Payments, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 1982, at Al.
91 See Herb Keinon, Unsettled Settlers: Many Will Go If the PriceIs Right, JERUSA-

LEM PosT, Dec. 10, 1993, at 2B, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Papers File; see also
Susan Hattis Rolef, Back to Green Line Israel, JERUSALEM PoST, Jan. 15, 1996, at 6,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Papers File (stating that increasing numbers of Jewish settlers would move if compensated).
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The majority position at the United Nations is based on these aims,
but cannot be pursued effectively because of the power exercised in the
situation by the United States. The United Nations, which assumed the
power and obligation of preserving the peace when it adopted its Charter
in 1945, could find Israel's posture on the key issues to be a threat to international peace and could take action of the kind it has taken elsewhere
in the world to force compliance.'
The majority in the United Nations recognizes a responsibility that
the world community carries, and in particular the United Nations, to see
the Palestinian-Israeli dispute through to an acceptable conclusion. The
posture of the United Nations on the Palestinian-Israeli issue has been
uncertain. Like Britain before it, the United Nations allowed the problem
to deteriorate. Just as Britain permitted a substantial in-migration of Jews
in the inter-war period, creating the social basis for the conflict, so did
the United Nations make a proposal for partition, in 1947, that was quite
inconsistent with what was legally required. 93 Then, when Jewish Agency
forces took matters into their own hands and overran Palestine in the
spring of 1948, forcing out the Palestinian population as they advanced,
the international community reacted only with verbal reprimand, but took
no effective action to ensure that the national and territorial rights of the
Palestinians would be upheld.
The Palestinians became the victims of a Europe that could not control anti-Semitism, and of lingering colonial attitudes to non-Western
peoples. The rights of the Palestinians in their own territory were viewed
as secondary to solving Europe's problems. The deterioration of the Palestine situation from 1947 onwards must be counted one of the greatest
failures of the United Nations as a world organization responsible for

maintaining peace.
The importance of achieving a law-based solution is seen if one contemplates the position in which the United Nations would find itself if a
non-law-based solution were agreed upon between the parties, if that
agreement led to violence threatening the international peace, and if the
United Nations at that point tried to intervene. The United Nations can
intervene only on the basis of universally held principles. If the PLO and
Israel should, hypothetically, arrive at an agreement that provides no
right of return to displaced Palestinians, and if a group of Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon or Jordan or Syria petitions the United Nations seeking affirmance of their right to return to their home areas within Israel,
92 See John Quigley, The United Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedentfor Israe'sArab Territories?2 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'LL. 195 (1992) (discussing U.N. action
taken against Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait).
93

See G.A. Res. 181, supra note 81, at 146.
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the United Nations would be hard pressed to tell those groups that their
aims are illegitimate. Those groups would be affirming a norm of a right
of repatriation for the displaced Palestinians, a position that the United
Nations has taken, as indicated above, since 1948. In such circumstances,
the United Nations would face a choice between following legal principle, or following the PLO-Israeli agreement.
VII. A ROLE FOR PARTES TO THE GENEVA CIVIJANS

CONVENTION

Another international mechanism, though a less formal one, may
play a role as well in the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.
These are the states that are party to the Geneva Civilians Convention. In
adopting this convention in 1949, these states established an ongoing
procedure to monitor the rights of peoples who might fall under belligerent occupation. Because the Geneva Civilians Convention is so widely
ratified, the states involved are, for the most part, the same states that are
members of the United Nations. Nonetheless, the Convention established
a separate mechanism, in its Article One. That article requires each state
party to "ensure respect" for the convention in all circumstances.94 This
provision establishes collective responsibility of the states parties towards any population that falls under belligerent occupation.
The U.N. Security Council referred to this collective responsibility
some years ago with respect to Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands.
Concerned that it had not been able to bring Israel into compliance with
its obligations under the law of belligerent occupation, the Council called
on the states parties to confer, on the basis of their obligation as Convention parties, to ensure that Israel respect its obligations.95 That call bore
little fruit at the time, but in 1998, as indicated above, the venture was
taken up again by the General Assembly, with its call on Switzerland to
convene a meeting of the states parties.9
The PLO-Israel negotiations will concern, in large measure, the territory comprised by the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan
River. Both these pieces of territory fall under the umbrella of the Geneva Civilians Convention since they are under Israel's belligerent occupation. The status of the territories as being under belligerent occupation
affects the manner in which their future is to be determined. The Geneva
94 See Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 12, art. 1.

95 See S.C. Res. 681, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2970th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/681
(1990) ("call[ing] upon the High Contracting Parties to the said Convention to ensure
respect by Israel, the occupying power, for its obligations under the Convention in accordance with article I thereof').
96 See G.A. Res. ES-10/4, supra note 30, at 3.
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Civilians Convention limits the scope of agreements that an occupying
power may make with authorities who represent the occupied population.
Article 47 of the Geneva Civilians Convention provides:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived,
in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present
Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of
a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor
by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied
territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.97
Any annexation, even a partial one, of the Gaza Strip or West Bank
would seem to be precluded by Article 47. It is, indeed, one of the basic
principles of the international law relating to military force that territory
may not be acquired through hostilities, regardless of whether the force
used to occupy the territory was offensive or defensive in character. Further, as indicated above, the Geneva Civilians Convention prohibits the
settling by, the occupying power of civilians in occupied territory.
Like the United Nations, however, the circle of states parties to the
Geneva Civilians Convention finds itself in the awkward position of having tolerated Israeli violations for so long that reversal becomes politically difficult. Nonetheless, the new situation created by the prospect of
Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations, plus the call by the U.N.
General Assembly for action by the states parties, may yield results.
VIII. A ROLE FOR EUROPE
The tension between a law-based solution and a politically feasible
solution is heightened by the role of the United States, as the major outside force in the situation. As indicated above, the United States, unlike
nearly all other member states of the United Nations, has declined to
pressure Israel into achieving law-based solutions to its differences with
the Palestinians.
To a certain degree, Europe has begun, collectively, to play a role
independent of that of the United States and thus, in some measure, to
offset its influence. In the mid-1990s, the European Union, through its
collective foreign relations mechanism, assumed an active role on the
issue, and its posture differed considerably from that of the United
States. The European Union directed pressure at Israel to conform to the
law of belligerent occupation, and the basis for the strength of its rec-

97 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 12, art. 47.
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ommendations was the considerable trade that Israel maintains with the
states of Europe. The European Union is Israel's largest export market.
In 1998 the European Commission adopted a decision urging the fifteen European Union member states to cease all imports of products
originating in Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories."
The basis for the decision was a 1995 trade agreement between the European Union and Israel that allows preferential tariff treatment for Israeli
products entering the states of the European Union but restricts this privilege to products originating in Israel.'
The European Commission construed the agreement to exclude
goods from the occupied territories, on the rationale that they are not the
territory of Israel.'01 To reach this conclusion, the European Commission
referred to international public law and to U.N. resolutions on the occupied Palestinian territories. 0'
Israel reacted to the European Commission decision by denouncing
the Commission for attempting to determine Israel's borders before the
conclusion of agreements between Israel and its neighbors." It said that
the, decision constituted an "attempt to prejudge Israel's borders, before
this problem is duly settled in Israel's talks with its neighbours."'' 3 That
response posed squarely the difference between a law-based approach
and a politically derived approach to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Israel was insisting on the primacy of whatever might be negotiated bilaterally, whereas the European Union was insisting on an approach based
on legal norms.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that if the European
Union insisted on boycotting imports from Israeli settlements, "that will
put an end to any attempt of the European Union to have any kind of fa-

98 See EUIsrael:Planfor Embargo on Exportsfrom Jewish Settlements, EuP. REP.,
May 16, 1998, at 10 [hereinafter Embargo];see also Mark Dennis, Breaking Through:
Has the EU FoundHow to Make Netanyahu Listen?, NEWSWEEK (Atlantic Edition) June
15, 1998, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library, MAGS File.
99 See, e.g., Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters Between the
European Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part and
the State of Israel, of the other part, 1996 O.J. (C 206) 2.
100 See Embargo, supra note 98, at 10.
101See id.
'1 See IsraelAngered by EU Call to Boycott Settlers' Produce, VOICE ISR., May 14,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. News File.
103 Embargo, supra note 98, at 10-11.
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cilitating role in the peace process."' 0 4 The European Commission, to the
contrary, found no inconsistency between insisting on a law-based approach and playing a facilitating role to bring agreement between the two
parties.
IX. CONCLUSION

The foregoing has reviewed, albeit briefly, the legal aspects of the
major issues outstanding between Israel and the PLO.' °5 It has also reviewed the posture of the international community on this question. With
respect to all the outstanding issues, the PLO takes a position that is consistent with international legal norms, whereas Israel takes a position inconsistent with those norms. The international community's agreement
with the PLO on these issues is reflected in U.N. resolutions and in the
activity of U.N. organs. The view that Israel takes on these legal standards is, in each instance, rejected by the international community, and is
inconsistent with those standards.
An Israel-P.L.O. agreement that fails to vindicate the legally protected interests of Palestinians would leave claims of individuals to be
resolved by whatever international mechanisms that may be in a position
to consider them. Rather than resolving the outstanding issues, such an
agreement would let these issues fester, causing difficulties for decades
to come.
Agreements resolving territorial disputes, like the dispute over historic Palestine between the Israelis and the Palestinians, must be based
on relevant norms that guarantee rights to individuals and communities.
Such conflicts are not isolated phenomena. Their solution must be based
on compliance with universally recognized norms, both to ensure the
rights of the parties, and to ensure that international mechanisms can play
their designated roles.
The international community is endeavoring to facilitate an agreement that will be consistent with legal norms. Such an agreement will
have a greater chance of remaining stable than one not so based. Such an
agreement will put the international community in a position of being
104 Netanyahu

Says EU Boycott Would Bar It from Peace Process, BALTIMORE SUN,

May 20, 1998, at 19A.
105 See John Quigley, Displaced Palestiniansand a Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 171 (1998); see also John Quigley, Living in Legal Limbo: Israel'sSettlers in Occupied PalestinianTerritory, 3 PACE INT' L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (reviewing the difficult
issues of rights to land between Israelis and Palestinians); John Quigley, Sovereignty in
Jerusalem, 45 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 765, 765-80 (1996) (discussing the issues surrounding Israel's claim to Jerusalem which need to be resolved between Palestine and Israel).
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able to deal with future threats to the peace and at the same time to support the propositions upon which the parties have reached resolution.

